Official figures show that the total extent of China's farmland has been steadily decreasing since the late 1950s and that it now stands at roughly 95 million hectares (Mha).' Divided by 1.243 billion people, China's mid-1998 population total, this prorates to less than 0.08 ha/capita, a rate comparable to that of Bangladesh, equal to only about 60 per cent of Asia's and to roughly 40 per cent of India's mean, and to just 25 per cent of the global average (Figure 1) . 2 This scarcity of agricultural land is a source of great concern in a country which, in spite of its low relative population growth rate, still adds 12-13 million people a year and whose rapid economic modernization has brought several-fold increases of average per capita consumption of animal foodstuffs, aquatic products, plant oils and fruits. 
China's food production should not be a matter of concern -but starting with correct data is an essential precondition of an informed appraisal of challenges facing the world's largest population as it moves towards its asymptote of some 1.5 billion people to be reached before the middle of the 21st century.5
Official Farmland Statistics: A History of Underestimates
The best available historical reconstruction must be seen merely as an indicator of trends: it shows the total of some 40 Mha during the Han dynasty followed by 17 centuries of fluctuations and then more than a century of steady expansion during the late Qing followed by even faster declined to 95.673 Mha and it was 94.97 Mha in 1995.8 This means that the official per capita means are now below one mu (that is less than 667 m2) in one-third of all provinces, with the lowest rates in southern coastal provinces averaging less than 500 m2.
For an uninitiated user the only indication that these official figures are suspect comes in small print at the bottom of the State Statistical Bureau's (SSB) land use table which notes that the figures "obtained from statistical checks during previous years ... are subject to further verification." But knowledgeable Chinese and interested foreign observers have always known that these official figures understate the actual total of China's cultivated area.
China has a long history of under-reporting its grain area, and these practices continued after 1949.9 Widespread use of non-standard mu for area measurements has been a long-standing source of uncertainty.1o Motives to under-report in communal farming were obvious: less reported land meant lower state production quota and reduced taxes -but a commune's leadership could use output from the unreported land to inflate the average yields and hence set new harvest records and be accordingly rewarded by red flags, banquets or trips to the capital. We will never know how widespread this undoubtedly common "helping field" phenomenon was before the privatization of the early 1980s.
Incentives to under-report are no less strong in privatized farming. To begin with, the initial division of land among peasants often recognized the inherent differences in land quality and, in order to equalize such disparities, multiples (commonly between 1.25 and 1.5) of less productive slopeland would be credited in registers as one mu of more productive farmland. Under-reporting of grain land also meant lower quota of cereals that had to be delivered to the state at the fixed price, and what is perhaps the most powerful incentive remains even after freeing agricultural prices: hiding land reduces taxes." While recognizing these facts, many bureaucrats in Beijing argued that "since there is no overwhelming reason to assume that the overall extent of inaccuracy has changed significantly during the last 30 years, the trends are not affected by this problem. 
Fields, Ponds, Orchards: New Patterns of Land Use and Nutrition
Although it is significantly higher than most of the new Chinese farmland estimates, I believe that even MEDEA's total may be too low. I believe it is logical to include aquacultural ponds and orchards in China's farmland total because these intensive land uses make very significant contributions to the country's balanced diet. Moreover, as shown in the next section, a large share of today's orchards and ponds (and in many counties and locales clearly a majority) has been converted from crop fields since 1980: land use has changed but the land has not only remained devoted to food production as it keeps supplying highquality protein and desirable micronutrients, but its new uses also provide a variety of environmental benefits.
With an annual yield of 10 t of fish per hectare, a carp pond will yield about 1,500 kg of protein, more than twice as much as good harvests of double-cropped rice from the same area (Table 2) China's per capita farmland availability is thus 2.5-3.0 times as large as that of its East Asian neighbours. This is a convincing argument against Brown's conclusion that the country has a pressing shortage of farmland and hence has little choice but to follow soon the East Asian pattern of food supply, that is to shift towards a high degree of dependence on food imports, particularly on massive purchases of feed grain. But to what extent is this encouraging conclusion being undermined by China's substantial farmland losses?
Farmland Losses: A Closer Look
When taking a long-term perspective it is quite valid to argue that concerns about continuous losses of farmland throughout the densely settled eastern third of China are not lessened by the fact that the overall total of agricultural land is higher than the official claim. Cumulative magnitude and the recent rapidity of this decline have been clearly worrying -and given the existing trends of relatively low, but in absolute terms still substantial, population increase and rapid economic expansion it must be expected that high rates of farmland loss will continue for many years to come.
According Table 3 , even the combined total of urban and rural construction has been responsible for less than one-fifth of China's recent farmland loss. The single largest cause -a third of the total -has been the conversion to forests and pastures. In an overwhelming number of cases this was merely a return to uses predating Mao's irrational Cultural Revolution-era policies of "taking grain as the main link" which led to indiscriminate conversion of grazing and forested land to low-productivity grain fields.29 These reversions should be welcome rather than regretted: reduced soil erosion, improved soil water retention, greater species diversity, more high-quality animal protein from grazing, and improved fuel and timber supply from new groves are obvious gains. 30 The second largest share, slightly more than a fifth of the total loss, was the result of conversion to orchards. Again, in many instances this was just a reversion to long-standing uses of many slopes or low-productivity sandy soils: orchards chopped down during the madness of the Great Leap Forward and uprooted during the grain-planting campaigns of the late 1960s returned to their traditional sites. But the acceleration of field-to-orchard conversions during the 1990s has gone far beyond the restoration: it reflects the increased demand for fruit, both for steadily diversifying domestic consumption and for export.31 Whatever their cause, two kinds of farmland losses have been most worrying: those occurring in areas with already inadequate food production capacity, and those eliminating the most productive grain fields and vegetable plots in suburban coastal areas. Guangxi, where millions of peasants still live in extreme poverty, and grain-deficient Gansu, a province losing thousands of hectares every year but gaining more than 330,000 people, are perhaps the best example in the first category. Widespread farmland loss in Jiangsu (the southern part of the province now has at least one new manufacturing enterprise every square kilometre) and in the Zhu River delta of Guangdong are the most obvious illustration of the second process.34
Cumulative effect of farmland losses has obviously weakened China's long-term food production capacity. Assuming the average mid-1990s cereal yield (4.5 t/ha) and mean multi-cropping ratio of 1.5, the net loss of about 20 Mha between 1950 and 1995 is an equivalent of forfeiting a food production base capable of supporting almost 250 million people on a largely vegetarian diet and about 175 million people on a diet similar to the one prevailing in today's China.35 And the recent average annual loss of roughly 500,000 ha (not including conversions to orchards and ponds) means a loss of food production capacity for at least 4 million people consuming today's typical Chinese diet. 
Long-term Outlook: Reasons for Concern
In 1997 China had at least 47 per cent (using MEDEA total) or just over 60 per cent (using MEDEA estimate enlarged by pond and orchard area) more farmland than indicated by its official statistics. As expected, this under-reported land is unevenly distributed among provinces: some of the greatest discrepancies are in hilly and mountainous areas where the quality of the unreported land will be relatively low and its degradation rates unacceptably high. But substantial under-reporting is the norm even in major regions of intensive multi-cropping, including Hubei (with MEDEA total 83 per cent above the official claim) and Jiangsu (with 45 per cent discrepancy), two provinces producing about 20 per cent of China's rice (Figure 3) . Naturally, these major underestimates of cultivated land mean general overestimates of officially claimed crop yields. But we should not assume any simple, direct relationship between overreported yields and underreported land: the difference between official and real totals for sown area (now put by the SSB at about 155 Mha annually) may be substantially smaller than for the total cropland (more land could be simply fallowed or used for unreported planting of forages or green manures). And if the reported harvests are fairly close to actual grain production it cannot simply be assumed that China's real staple grain yields are up to 50 per cent lower than the official figures -but it must be appreciated that they must be substantially (at least 15 per cent for rice in some provinces and not uncommonly 40 per cent for corn in the south-west) lower than the reported rates.36 This means China's average grain yields are still appreciably below the South Korean and Japanese rates, giving the country more room to improve crop productivity by using additional inputs and better agro- or greatly limiting cropland conversions to non-agricultural uses.38 But it must be expected that even the most stringent orders against the conversion of farmland -those establishing permanent arable land reserves, areas where no farmland can be converted to any non-agricultural useswill be repeatedly circumvented in such a precipitously modernizing economy ruled by pervasive corruption and by opportunities for some truly fabulous profits.
In contrast, a reform of land tenure would undoubtedly go a long way towards moderating or preventing farmland loss caused by soil degradation, and it would provide strong incentives for increasing the quality of currently low-yielding land. Good agronomic practices -appropriate tillage, suitable crop rotations, continuous recycling of crop residues and other organic wastes, and efficient use of fertilizer and irrigation watercan reverse deterioration in soil quality, but these cumulative improvements are predicated on assured long-term ownership of land.
Field surveys shows that peasants are willing to invest considerable amounts of capital to improve wasteland acquired on very long-term leases (50-100 years) in auctions, even in some of the country's poorest regions.39 This indicates that a reform of the existing land tenure, that is replacement of relatively short-term leases by long-term property rights, would tend to improve the quality of land. Indeed, a revealing study in Hebei province showed that the use of manure falls by 0.1 m3 and phosphate use declines by 0.34 kg for every year of tenure reduction. Given the mean difference of nine years between tenures of private and responsibility plots this means that farmers would have applied 18 per cent more manure and 36 per cent more phosphate fertilizer if they had managed responsibility plots in the same assiduous manner with which they tended their private land."
But even a wider adoption of desirable agronomic practices would take time to translate into appreciably reduced farmland losses and better soil quality.41 Consequently, China may not be able to prevent annual farmland losses on the order of 0.3-0.5 Mha a year during much of the next generation. This would add up to the loss of 7-11 Mha of farmland between 1998 and 2020, and even with yields stable at the mid-1990s' level this land could feed at least 60-90 million people. Gradually increasing grain imports are thus highly likely -but given China's export earnings and the state of the world grain market there should be little problem with the country eventually doubling, or even tripling, its current low grain imports.42
Changing the balance between higher domestic production through farming intensification and higher reliance on food imports will be determined by complex interactions of economic growth, consumer demand, environmental degradation, world grain prices and policy preferences. But it would take an extraordinary concatenation of poor decisions and failures to adapt to shifting circumstances to justify any catastrophic scenarios of China's food production during the coming generation. The now indisputable fact that the country has at least 40 per cent, and perhaps as much as 60 per cent, more farmland than admitted by its official statistics is a major reason for a fairly hopeful outlook. 
